This research investigated the role of contemplation, conversation (conceptualized as social contemplation), and explanations in right-wrong decisions. Several theories suggest that contemplation or morally-oriented conversations will promote ethical decisions and that immediate choice or self-interested conversations will not; other theories suggest that individuals' explanations will reinforce their decisions. An experimental task tempting people to lie supported all of these predictions. In addition, truth-tellers viewed the situation as morally-oriented and non-truth-tellers viewed it as oriented around self-interest, both before and after their decisions. These findings provided the basis for a new, process model of moral decision making. Moral decisions, which Jones (1991) and Kidder (1996) have characterized as value-based, volitional choices with interdependent consequences, feature prominently in organizations. The current research investigates a set of moral decisions that are not just common but crucially important in organizational contexts: right-wrong decisions (Ashforth et al., 2008; Beauchamp, Bowie, & Arnold, 2008; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2000; Darley, Messick, & Tyler, 2001; Jones, 1991; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) . Although most people feel that they have a good sense of what is right and wrong, right-wrong decisions remain difficult because doing the wrong thing can be incredibly tempting. Yet, the long-term consequences of an unethical decision can impose dramatic costs on organizations (Beauchamp et al., 2008; Brief et al., 2000) : recent allegations against Goldman Sachs, for instance, resulted in significant reputational damage and fines of $550 million (Guerrera, Sender, & Baer, 2010) . Thus, it is surprising that research on right-wrong decisions is not voluminous: many theoretical and empirical questions remain open, including questions concerning the basic, psychological processes that directly influence individuals' moral decisions (Darley et al., 2001; Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006) .
result in the construction of explanations, and that conversations are a typical context for explanations (e.g., -Causal explanation takes place in and takes the form of conversation‖; Hilton, 1990: 5) . Thus, we view explanations as an essential component of right-wrong decision making in organizations. Since individuals craft explanations either as they make their decisions (Beach, 1998) or after they have decided (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2001; Shaw et al., 2003) , our empirical approach investigates both possibilities: we assess the relationship between a priori explanations and decisions (by analyzing conversation content ) as well as the relationship between decisions and post hoc explanations (e.g., Kelley, 1967) . Because it is difficult to measure exactly when individuals actually make their decisions, a priori and post hoc refer to explanations' position relative to the visible -event‖ of registering the decision.
Like contemplation and conversation, explanations also fit an individual/contextual dichotomy, as right-wrong decision makers may need to explain both their own decisions and the situation that led to their decision (Scott & Lyman, 1968) . Overall, our goals are to understand the effects of and the linkages between contemplation, conversation, and explanations. Ultimately, we hope to develop a set of prescriptions that facilitate ethical decision making in organizations.
RIGHT-WRONG DECISIONS
Right-wrong decisions represent an especially important subset of moral decisions because they are common and consequential, in organizations and in general (Beauchamp et al., 2008; Brief et al., 2000; Jones, 1991; Margolis & Molinsky, 2008) . For example, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimates that U.S. businesses lost $994 billion on employee fraud in 2008 alone.
Unlike general, everyday decisions, moral decisions necessarily concern values; unlike rightright decisions, which involve a difficult choice between competing moral values (e.g., justice and mercy; Kidder, 1996) , right-wrong decisions pit a moral value (e.g., honesty) against basic selfinterest (e.g., lying to get ahead). Thus, right-wrong decisions include alternatives that are clearly ethical (reflecting normative values) and clearly unethical (reflecting the temptation to violate normative values for personal gain).
1 Although what is right and what is wrong in a right-wrong decision may be easy to identify, right-wrong decisions can be far from easy to make. On one hand, organizations and individuals often do -right‖ (e.g., Johnson & Johnson's swift recall of Tylenol); on the other, doing -wrong‖ can be tremendously enticing. The underlying reason behind many corporate scandals is not that people do not understand the -wrongness‖ of their actions: Enron executives, for example, almost certainly knew that their accounting practices were irregular (McLean & Elkind, 2004) . The social and organizational problem lies in the fact that, even with this knowledge, people still do wrong (Brief et al., 2000) .
The normative clarity of right-wrong decisions-the fact that an ethical -right‖ is clear and obviously distinguishable from an unethical -wrong‖-makes it possible to conduct straightforward tests of the link between psychological processes and ethicality (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008 ).
Right-right decisions, in contrast, are particularly ambiguous, as either option (e.g., justice or mercy)
is normatively acceptable, even admirable. At the same time, the past research on right-right decisions has yielded important, theoretical insights that facilitate analysis of the dynamic forces behind right-wrong decisions-most notably, the notion that cognitive awareness of relevant moral values is an important precursor to ethical decisions. Because empirical research on right-wrong decisions is relatively thin (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008) , our hypotheses draw from models of both right-right and right-wrong decision making.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
Rational and moral reasoning models suggest that in moral situations, contemplation is an essential element of moral decision making (e.g., Etzioni, 1988; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Kohlberg, 1969; Murnighan, Cantelon, & Elyashiv, 2001; Piaget & Gabain, 1966) . Other models, however, 1 We use the term -moral‖ categorically, to describe a particular type of decision, i.e., one concerning values. We use the term -ethical‖ evaluatively, to describe decisions that are normatively appropriate (with its opposite being unethical).
suggest that contemplation is peripheral (Haidt, 2001) or counterproductive, fostering moral disengagement and self-interested choices (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) .
Pure contemplation, completely devoid of social context, may not be realistically possible (Allport, 1968) , especially in organizations (Darley et al., 2001; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964) . Thus, we also assess the effects of conversations, which we conceptualize as social contemplation. Because conversations, by definition, involve an exchange (i.e., monologs do not qualify; Schegloff, 1984 Schegloff, , 1987 , they allow individuals to assess -unsystematically and unscientifically -how at least one other individual sees the situation and its related norms (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991) . They also allow people to begin formulating their own explanations and decisions. Conversations can obviously take many forms (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990 ); they are particularly influential when a speaker is well-informed, articulate, engaging, and onpoint (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) . We present a conservative test of conversation's effects by confining our analysis to truly minimal conversations: simple email exchanges with an anonymous stranger who alludes to situational norms.
As noted, the inevitable presence of other organizational actors means that explanations, a third psychological process, are also critically important. Because people are required or feel compelled to explain their decisions (Festinger, 1957; Lewicki, 1987) , explanations are particularly common in organizations (Shapiro, 1991) . After explanations become public, they can also act as fodder for future conversation and contemplation, with additional organizational implications.
CONTEMPLATION
Scholars have long suggested that contemplation can help people resolve moral conflicts.
Both Plato (1909/300's BC) and Aristotle (1972/300's BC) viewed reasoning as the arbiter of conflicting values; other philosophers (e.g., Aquinas, 1274 Aquinas, /1947 Bentham, 1823; Kant & Ellington, 1785 /1983 Rawls, 1971 ) have also posited a direct connection between values and the conscious consideration of rules. More recent models of moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1958 Kohlberg, , 1969 Piaget & Gabain, 1966) and value-based decision making (e.g., Etzioni, 1988; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993) suggest that contemplation allows decision makers to access, consider, and integrate moral values, increasing the likelihood of ethical decisions.
Developmental theorists (e.g., Kohlberg, 1958 Kohlberg, , 1969 Piaget, 1932) have characterized contemplation as the cornerstone of moral reasoning, and reasoning as the essence of moral decision making, particularly for right-right decisions. For instance, Kohlberg (1958) (Cushman et al., 2006) . Theories of moral imagination (e.g., Werhane, 1999) contend that people need to consider a situation from several perspectives, including a moral perspective, to achieve moral awareness. Etzioni's (1988) and Keeney and Raiffa's (1993) economic approaches suggest that pre-decision contemplation can help individuals balance personal values against economic considerations, and Beach's (1998) image theory suggests that individuals make tough, high-stakes choices by -searching for arguments‖ that are consistent with their values, goals, and plans. Finally, recent research on -necessary evils‖ (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008; Molinsky & Margolis, 2005) suggests that individuals who make tough, moral choices every day (e.g., police officers) are most effective when they cognitively contemplate the right-wrong elements of their choices.
Moral decision making models have also characterized a lack of contemplation as a basis for undermining ethicality. blunting their access to advanced moral reasoning. Finally, Moore and Loewenstein (2004) suggested that self-interest is automatically compelling, and that, at a minimum, people need time to contemplate before they can realistically consider their moral obligations. Collectively, these models suggest that decisions made immediately are ethically perilous, and that contemplation can promote ethical decisions by facilitating access to moral values. Empirical tests of the connection between contemplation and ethicality, however, have been relatively rare (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008 ).
This may partly reflect the indeterminacy of right-right decisions (i.e., which -right‖ is more ethical), which we avoid in this research by investigating relatively unambiguous right-wrong choices.
Whatever their economic merits, for example, the moral merits of honesty and lying are easily differentiated (Haidt, 2001) . We suggest that contemplation can be particularly valuable in rightwrong decision making because it gives people time to actively consider the values associated with the less tempting, -right‖ choice. In essence, contemplation lets decision makers weigh their moral principles against their self-interested desires. This all suggests that contemplated choices should be more ethical than immediate choices (i.e., choices made with enough time to process the situation, but not enough time to contemplate).
Models of moral intuition (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) and moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006) , however, question the importance of contemplation. Moral intuition models investigate decisions in which the -wrong‖ evokes a strong, negative emotion, typically disgust (e.g., whether to eat a pet to stave off hunger; Haidt, 2001) . Haidt (2001) argued that these affectively-charged decisions prompt automatic, effortless, and emotional reactions (i.e., moral intuitions), which lead to quick decisions.
In other words, people immediately know which alternative is right without needing to contemplate.
Indeed, contemplation is only necessary post hoc, to help individuals construct socially-acceptable explanations. Moral intuition models are consistent with models of naturalistic decision making (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007; Zsambok & Klein, 1997) , which suggest that people make many choices immediately, without contemplation.
Moral disengagement models address decisions in which the -wrong,‖ though clearly wrong, can be portrayed as -right‖ (e.g., lying -to keep your friends out of trouble‖; Bandura et al., 1996) .
Bandura and his colleagues (e.g., 1996) define disengagement as the outcome of this reconstrual process, which seems to require contemplation. In other words, moral disengagement models suggest that contemplation releases people from their moral constraints by helping them find creative reconstruals of behavior that would otherwise seem wrong. Overall, then, the moral intuition and moral disengagement models question the importance of contemplation.
Although -wrongs‖ that evoke disgust or that invite reconstrual are important, we suggest that most of the right-wrong decisions that organizational actors face do neither. Many organizational decisions concern money rather than -disgusting‖ taboos. In addition, many organizational decisions are stark-juxtaposing a clear right against a clear wrong-which should make it difficult to reinterpret moral obligations and reconstrue a -wrong‖ as right. Thus, although we recognize that contemplation can focus attention on either ethical or self-interested action, we predict that, for right-wrong decisions in organizations, contemplation will encourage a consideration of moral values and increase the likelihood of ethical decisions. Thus:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to immediate choice, contemplation will result in more ethical decisions.
CONVERSATION
The social nature of organizations means that organizational decision-making models must account for social context. A huge literature on decision-making, some morally-relevant, has investigated the psychological impact of social context (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Latané & Rodin, 1969; Milgram, 1963) , and recent moral decision making models respect the importance of social interaction, at least implicitly (e.g., Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005; Cohen, Gunia, Kim, & Murnighan, 2009; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009 ). The social exchange of situationallyrelevant statements (i.e., conversation), however, does not yet have a fundamental role (Darley et al., 2001; Trevino et al., 2006) . Thus, we introduce conversation as an important arena of inquiry in moral decision making.
We conceptualize conversations as social contemplation because they allow people to think out-loud, with others' assistance. In particular, conversations allow people to compare their interpretation of the situation with others' interpretations (e.g., Festinger, 1954) . Because conversations are -situated within specific contexts and designed with specific attention to these contexts‖ (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990: 5) , they can help people make sense of what is appropriate or inappropriate (e.g., Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Milgram, 1963) . Because people may not -know what they think until they see what they say‖ (Weick, 1993) , and because they strive to be consistent (Festinger, 1957) , what people say can matter as much as what they hear.
If conversation is akin to social contemplation, then the effects of conversing (i.e., conducting a two-way exchange of situationally-relevant information) should be similar to the effects of contemplation, which suggests: (Schegloff, 1984 (Schegloff, , 1987 .
This allows us to -open the black box‖ of conversation and consider the effects of its content.
Although conversation content can vary almost infinitely (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990) , we created strong constraints on the conversations in our experiment, restricting people to a single, short email exchange. This allowed us to focus on a central attribute of conversations: their normative content (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Pillutla & Chen, 1999; Sherif, 1936) .
Because norms help people make sense of ambiguous situations, we predicted that normative content would influence the effects of conversations on ethicality. In right-wrong situations, two norms are particularly prominent and likely to arise from conversation: those that support what is -right‖ and those that support what is -wrong‖ (Etzioni, 1988; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999 ).
Comments about a situation's moral issues can highlight what is right, emphasizing moral norms, prompting moral awareness, and suggesting that moral action is appropriate (Etzioni, 1988) . In contrast, comments about a situation's economic issues can highlight norms of self-interest, suggesting that moral awareness may not be particularly relevant and that economic outcomes are acceptable and appropriate (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001 ).
Thus, we predict that conversations that evoke moral norms, even in the most minimal fashion (minimal -moral conversations‖), will facilitate and validate the consideration of moral values, suppressing self-interest and providing social proof that others consider moral action appropriate (Cialdini et al., 1990) . In contrast, minimal conversations that evoke norms of self- 
EXPLANATIONS
People who work in organizations have many reasons to care about their own and their colleagues' explanations (Shaw et al., 2003) because explanations, like conversations, can act as sensemaking devices, helping individuals understand complex situations (Weick, 1993) . Especially when the stakes are high, as they can be in right-wrong decisions, explanations become important and often necessary (Lewicki, 1987; Scott & Lyman, 1968) . Thus, any model of right-wrong decision making in organizations should include explanations. In addition, contemplation and conversation can help individuals construct explanations, and conversation can allow them to test or share their explanations (Festinger, 1954) .
It is easy to see how explanations connect with moral intuition and moral reasoning models:
Moral intuition models suggest that right-wrong decisions prompt immediate, morally-dichotomous reactions: people know what is right and wrong right away (Haidt, 2001) . Moral reasoning models suggest that contemplation is required to appreciate right and wrong (Kohlberg, 1969) . Either way, people who have reached an initial inclination can then engage in a search for arguments (Beach, 1998) or justifications (Bandura et al., 1996) -on their own (via further contemplation) or socially (via conversation)-that can help convert inclinations into decisions or justify decisions already made. Thus, people may begin to develop explanations either before (-a priori‖) or after registering their decisions (-post hoc‖).
1999; Sherif, 1936) . Thus, explanations tend to succeed when they focus on the situation and its norms. Although attribution theory implies that only wrongdoers should cite the situation in their attributions, we suggest that people who act ethically will also cite the situation in their explanations.
Situational explanations for ethical choices provide a socially-acceptable rationale (everyone facing this situation would act the same way); they also avoid the appearance of self-promotion. In addition, situational explanations for unethical choices can provide an acceptable rationale and avoid blame.
Thus, situational, norm-focused explanations should be effective in both cases, for ethical and for unethical decisions. (Note, however, that people can still make personal attributions privately.)
As noted, two classes of norms-moral and self-interested-often arise in right-wrong situations. It seems reasonable that situational, norm-focused explanations, like conversations, will focus on these same two norms. In other words, decision makers in the midst or the wake of a rightwrong decision are likely to explain it as a function of moral or self-interested norms-whichever supports their decision. They could say, for example, that the situation demands honesty, or that everyone -looks out for #1.‖ As these examples highlight, neither moral nor self-interested explanations are inherently ethical or unethical, since the latter could be amoral rather than unethical.
Our empirical context allowed us to test whether moral decision makers used situational explanations, both a priori and post hoc. While it was impossible to unobtrusively assess the a priori explanations of people who contemplated, what people said in their conversations provided a source of a priori explanations. In the context of this study, people heard a conversation partner's statement, replied, and then made their own decision. If their replies were consistent with both the partner's statement and their own decision, it would suggest that people were mimicking and implementing their partner's viewpoint. If their replies were more consistent with their partner's statement than their ultimate decision, it would suggest that they were mimicking but not implementing the partner's viewpoint. If their replies were more consistent with their own ultimate decision than their partner's viewpoint, it would suggest they had already reached an initial inclination and were using the explanation to justify it a priori, i.e., before registering it.
As noted, we interpret a priori explanations as a justification mechanism. Attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) suggests that individuals tend to use post hoc explanations for the same purpose.
Thus, for both a priori and post hoc explanations:
Hypothesis 5: Individuals' explanations will be more consistent with their decisions than with their counterparts' conversational statements.
Hypothesis 6: Individuals who make ethical (unethical) decisions will emphasize the situation's moral (self-interested) norms in their explanations.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH
The current research presented participants with a clear, right-wrong decision: whether to tell an overt lie (in hopes of boosting their own payoffs) or tell the truth (and likely receive a lower payoff). To rule out other forces that might have influenced their decisions and to focus on fundamental psychological processes, we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment. This allowed us to isolate and compare the effects of contemplation and immediate choice with the effects of conversations that included one of three distinct sets of content.
Thus, we created five, independent conditions to observe the effects of contemplation, immediate choice, and three kinds of conversations: moral, self-interested, and control. In the contemplation condition, we asked individuals to -think very carefully‖ about their decision and gave them three minutes to do so. In the immediate choice condition, we asked individuals to make their decisions in a much shorter timeframe, limiting their opportunity to contemplate. Thus, immediate choice served as a comparison condition for contemplation.
The conversation conditions provided a conservative test of our predictions, as they were truly minimal: participants exchanged a single email with someone described as an anonymous, randomly-selected peer who was making the same decision that they were. Thus, conversation partners had neither a stake in participants' decisions, nor any particular expertise. In actuality, these partners did not exist; instead, participants received pre-programmed messages indicating that morality or self-interest was the appropriate basis for action, or that the normative basis was unclear (the control conversation). After receiving one of these emails, participants in the conversation conditions sent a reply email that we coded for a priori explanations. In all five conditions, The use of undergraduates in an experiment is a methodological choice that should be made carefully rather than conveniently. In the current research, we chose experimental methods to increase control and to test specific theoretical hypotheses; alternative (field) methods would almost necessarily suffer from variation in decision contexts, in the content of social interactions, and in the timing of participants' decisions. We also felt that right-wrong decisions that had obvious moral consequences were not particularly experience-dependent: by the time individuals have reached college, they know the difference between right and wrong, and they can make thoughtful decisions.
Research on moral reasoning also suggests that most, if not all people have reached the peak of their moral development by their late teens (Kohlberg, 1958) . Thus, undergraduates were an appropriate sample, and one that might be enticed by the limited outcomes that our budget could provide.
Procedures. Each participant sat at a computer terminal in either a private room or cubicle, completed a consent form, and was randomly assigned to one of the five conditions. The first screen indicated that they would work on a decision making task with a randomly-selected participant whom they would not meet during or after the experiment. They also learned that their decision(s)
would determine how much of the additional $10 they would receive.
They were told that the members of each pair would be randomly assigned to the roles of player 1 and player 2. The computer, however, always assigned participants to be player 1 in a modified version of Gneezy's (2005) Although the words -truth‖ and -lie‖ were not mentioned, participants had only two choices: to send a truthful message, -Option B earns you more than Option A,‖ or a lie, -Option A earns you more than Option B.‖ Previous research (Cohen et al., 2009; Gneezy, 2005) has shown that most participants (80%+) expect their counterpart to believe them, meaning that they expect that a truthful message will decrease their payoff and a lie will increase it. Several participants did suggest that they had told the truth in hopes that their counterpart would not believe them. We ran all of the analyses with and without these participants; excluding them did not change the results. Thus, we included all of the data in the final analyses. .001), suggesting that they needed slightly more time or that they were conflicted about their choice.
Controlling for their response times in the analyses did not change any of the results.
After the initial instructions, participants in the conversation conditions learned that they and another, randomly-selected, anonymous -participant‖ would send each other one email. The instructions emphasized that their conversation partner was not their player 2 counterpart, but another player 1, making the same decision that they were, with a different player 2. In other words, conversation partners were in the exact same situation as participants. Although the order of the two emails was ostensibly random, the nonexistent -partners‖ always sent the first email.
In the moral conversation condition, the partner's message suggested that most people would be truthful in situations like this, so they were planning to send the truthful message; in the selfinterested condition, the message suggested that most people would see the pursuit of self-interest as appropriate in situations like this, so they were planning to send the message that maximized their In all of the conditions, after participants had made their decision but before it was delivered, they learned that they could add an additional line to their message: -This is the truth.‖ After making this second decision, participants responded to a series of post-experiment questions concerning their perceptions of the situation, their counterpart, and their own decision. Finally, we thanked, debriefed, and paid participants individually, probing thoroughly for suspicion.
Measures
Preliminary Measures and Manipulation Checks. We included several measures to detect whether people tried to use -reverse psychology‖ by telling the truth and hoping for disbelief. Thus, participants indicated how much they expected player 2s to believe them and how much player 2s did believe them. The responses to these questions were highly correlated, so we combined them into a -belief‖ index ( = .90). In addition, two independent coders blind to the hypotheses rated participants' emails and open-ended responses for participants' expectations that they would be believed, and their attempts to use reverse psychology. Finally, to check the conversation manipulations, participants indicated how much their email partners encouraged them to tell the truth or lie on 7-point, Likert-type scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so).
Ethicality. The main dependent measure was whether participants sent a lie (coded 1) or a truthful message (coded 2). Participants' choice to say -This is the truth‖ added to their decision:
they could lie and call it the truth, simply lie, simply tell the truth, or tell the truth and call it the truth.
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Because these four categories cannot be considered ordinal, however, we simply noted how often people in each condition added -This is the truth.‖ Explanations. We measured participants' explanations (moral norm versus self-interested norm) in three ways: via codings of their emails (conversation conditions only), their responses to an open-ended question, and a set of close-ended items. Two coders, blind to the hypotheses, read participants' emails and rated them on three dimensions: how much they explained the situation as -moral,‖ -business,‖ and -economic.‖ Of 82 emails, 79 were codable. After coding 20 randomlyselected responses, the coders met to discuss and reconcile their disagreements. Each then rated the remaining emails independently. The three ratings were significantly correlated across coders (mean r = .40) and with each other (mean r = .54), so we reverse-scored the latter two and combined all three into an -a priori moral explanation index‖ (capturing implicit moral versus selfinterested norms After making their decisions, participants responded to an open-ended question asking why they had chosen the message they did. After coding 50 of these responses (using the same moral / business / economic coding scheme), the two coders discussed and reconciled their disagreements, and then rated the remaining responses independently. These ratings were also correlated across coders (mean r = .38) and with each other (mean r = .54); they were combined (as before) into a -post hoc moral explanation index‖ (again, Participants then responded to two items asking whether most people -would find it completely appropriate to send Message 1‖ and -…to send Message 2.‖ Their responses were combined into a -self-reported moral norm index,‖ albeit with somewhat low reliability (Participants also completed two additional items asking whether they saw the situation as morally-or business-oriented. Appendix C lists all of the items.
Post-Experiment
Results
Contemplation and moral conversations had strong effects: both led to more ethical decisions than immediate choice and self-interested conversations. Participants also provided a priori and post hoc explanations that consistently supported their actions, whether they told the truth or lied. Ethicality. Contemplation led people to tell the truth more than immediate choices did, and people who had a minimal moral conversation told the truth significantly more than people whose conversations emphasized self-interest. As expected, the conditions led to significantly different rates of truth-telling (Χ 2 = 12.89, p = .01; see Figure 1 ). In each of the five conditions, however, truth-tellers equaled or outnumbered people who lied-a reassuring finding on its own.
Preliminary Analyses and Manipulation Checks.
Hypothesis 1, which predicted that contemplation would promote ethicality in comparison to immediate choice, was supported: almost 90% of the people in the contemplation condition sent truthful messages, compared to just more than half in the immediate choice condition [n = 26 of 30 (86.67%) vs. n = 19 of 34 (55.88%)]. A logistic regression yielded an odds ratio of 5.13, indicating that the odds of someone telling the truth were more than five times higher in the contemplation condition than in the immediate choice condition β = 1.64, SE = .64, Wald Χ 2 = 6.56, p = .01).
Entering response time as a covariate had no appreciable effects on these results, and response time itself was not significant (p = .91). None of the participants who contemplated told a lie and called it the truth, while 18% of the immediate choosers did. Likewise, immediate choosers lied more often and told the truth less often without adding -This is the truth‖ (see Table 2 ).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that conversations would increase ethicality, in comparison to immediate choice. To test this, we compared all three conversation conditions to the immediate choice condition. Although the proportion of truth-tellers was higher in the conversation conditions 2.10, p = .15). The odds of telling the truth were four times higher for people who had a moral versus a self-interested conversation. Like contemplation, no one who had a moral conversation lied and called it the truth, while 7% of those who had a self-interested conversation did (see Table 2 ).
Hypothesis 4, which predicted that moral conversations and contemplation would lead to more ethical choices than immediate choice and self-interested conversations, was supported:
83.64% of the participants who contemplated or had a moral conversation told the truth compared to -
--------------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 
about here ---------------------------------------------------------
Explanations
DISCUSSION
This research provides new insights and new evidence on three philosophically-central, psychologically-basic, and organizationally-relevant moral decision making processes: contemplation, conversations, and explanations. It integrated a variety of literatures to investigate one particularly important type of moral decision making. Our goal was to tease apart the effects of decision processes that everyday experience can easily confound. Our findings suggest that contemplation and conversation can influence people's right-wrong decisions: contemplation and moral conversations seem to provide alternate routes to ethicality, while immediate choice and selfinterested conversations seem to provide detours around it. In addition, our findings suggest that people devise situational explanations before and/or after their decisions that are consistent with those decisions.
The findings provide clear support for the assertion that contemplation is critical for moral decisions, as suggested by moral reasoning and other decision models (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) . At the same time, people in our experiment had no problem making relatively rapid decisions, supporting a central assumption of moral intuition models (e.g., Haidt, 2001) . The data did not, however, support their contention that contemplation only occurs post hoc. The logic of the moral disengagement models was also not supported, as contemplation clearly amplified rather than dampened ethical action, relative to immediate choice. Although anecdotes often suggest that people use contemplation to construct explanations for their unethical actions, we did not observe this in our study. Thus, future research might continue to investigate when -unethical contemplation‖ is likely.
Toward a Process Model
Our findings provide the foundation for a process model of right-wrong decision making (see Figure 2 ). Given the status of the empirical research in this area, our model is necessarily preliminary; at the same time, it summarizes our findings succinctly and offers a platform for future research.
Overall, the model depicts the connections among a potentially right-wrong situation, individuals' immediate reactions, subsequent psychological processes, decisions, and explanations.
It suggests that decision makers have immediate inclinations in these situations; processes like contemplation and conversation can then influence and potentially modify these inclinations, with explanations following quickly or even slightly preceding their decisions.
When individuals contemplate or converse, their decisions take time. Thus, we depict these processes as solid arrows in the figure, in contrast to the dashed arrow for immediate choice.
Because contemplation and moral conversations led to more ethical choices, possibly by facilitating access to moral values, we depict these lines with an upward slope. Moral reasoning researchers might interpret the data as evidence that contemplation or conversation allow for active engagement of the moral reasoning system. Because immediate choice and self-interested conversations led to less ethical decisions, possibly by suppressing individuals' moral values, they have a downward slope, reflecting the fact that self-interested conversations seemed to motivate individuals to lie. This downward slope is not as steep as the upward slope because individuals in these conditions still told the truth about half of the time.
5
Everyone provided explanations for their decisions-quickly, with ease, and in direct relation to their decisions. Frankly, it is difficult to determine the exact timing of individuals' decisions and their explanations; the current data suggest that they may be almost contiguous. Strictly speaking, a priori explanations always preceded and post hoc explanations always followed people's registered decisions. However, the tight relationships between the a priori and the post hoc explanations and people's decisions suggests that explanations are integral to the decision process-before, during, and/or after-and that an intra-psychic decision may have preceded individuals' email explanations.
Determining whether it did requires future research, possibly using neuro-imaging methods. Thus, based on our results, the figure depicts explanations as surrounding decisions (slightly).
We used individuals' emails, open-ended responses, and responses to a series of self-report items to assess their explanations; all of these measures were consistent with one another and were almost completely unaffected by the experimental conditions. Liars characterized the situation in terms of self-interest across all three modes of expression; truth-tellers characterized the same situation morally. Because the relationships between explanations and decisions were so consistent, our model locates ethical decisions next to moral explanations and unethical decisions next to self-5 For ease-of-presentation, the figure does not include control conversations. interest explanations. In a sense, it seems that contemplation and conversation -locked-in‖ individuals' decisions, which locked-in contiguous explanations.
Because individuals may not -know what they think until they see what they say‖ (Weick, 1993 ) and because they try to be consistent in their private attitudes and their public statements (Festinger, 1957) , individuals' explanations might also influence their subsequent moral reasoning and decisions. Thus, although our current data ended with Figure 2 's explanations box, we speculate that current explanations may influence subsequent conversations and contemplation. For example, self-interested action that prompts self-interested explanations may easily highlight self-interested norms during future right-wrong decisions, which could then justify additional self-interested action.
Thus, we include straight lines to connect explanations with subsequent situations. Although this prediction follows research on cognitive consistency (e.g., Festinger, 1957) , it conflicts with recent research (e.g., Zhong, Ku, Lount, & Murnighan, 2010) suggesting that ethical actions license individuals to subsequently relax their moral standards, and vice-versa. These conflicting predictions provide particularly fruitful avenues for future research. In addition, if decision makers use conversations to explain their choices, as our participants seem to have done, then current explanations may influence future conversations, which could, in turn, influence others' subsequent moral choices. Thus, the potential spread of moral and self-interested norms via explanation-focused conversations offers another fruitful avenue for research.
Subtle Influences on Serious Choices
Although this research used what might seem like weak manipulations-asking people to think about a moral decision for only three minutes, choose immediately, or exchange a single email with a stranger-the effects were sizable. In addition to the fairly striking effects of contemplation, the results also highlight the influence of minimal social interactions, even in self-relevant contexts that involve moral decisions (Tetlock et al., 2000) . The conversations in our experiment-as simple as they were-had potent effects, pushing people one way or the other. Given the current ubiquity of email and text messaging, these findings are troubling. More generally, they suggest that right-wrong decisions can put people on the fence, straddling ethical action and temptation, and that even minimal influence processes can have big effects. This also suggests that the process of making right-wrong decisions deserves more research attention. Thus, research might attempt to identify whether various combinations of pre-decision processes might improve moral decision making, or explore the boundary conditions for the effects of contemplation and conversation.
The results also beg a straightforward question: why would anyone bend their moral standards for only $5? In fact, prior research suggests that $5 may have been generous: Gneezy's (2005) original study of these truth-lie decisions found that 36% of his participants lied for a mere $1.
Similarly, Cohen et al. (2009) observed lying rates near 50% for individuals and 80% for groups, also for a single dollar. Pillutla & Murnighan (1995) also found that people chose patently unfair outcomes to earn an extra dollar. Despite our own theorizing, we still find it remarkable that the brief email messages in our study, from people whom participants had never and would never meet-and whose opinion had no bearing on their own outcome-could have such a strong impact on individuals' moral decisions. Whether conversations led them toward or away from ethicality, the fact that people were influenced at all by such minimal conversations is troubling, as it suggests that people routinely depend on others, even unknown others, to direct their moral choices.
Although our findings do support moral reasoning models' focus on contemplation, the -social pliability‖ of people's moral standards does not bode well for models of stable, wellreasoned moral systems (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) . The data suggest that, just as a moral conversation can bolster moral reasoning, a self-interested conversation can undermine it. Thus, our results suggest that a single individual's moral reasoning may exhibit wide and substantial variation, socially and circumstantially. It is important to qualify these statements by noting that Hypothesis 2 was not supported; conversation in and of itself did not seem to alter people's immediate reactions appreciably. Instead, it was the content of conversation that was critical. This is also likely to be true for contemplation, as thoughts about the weather are unlikely to have much impact on moral choices.
Future research might explore both contemplation and conversation content in-tandem, and the boundary conditions under which this content gains or loses relevance.
It is also important to acknowledge that organizational decision makers often choose their conversation partners, consciously or unconsciously, to support their intuitive inclinations. They may also seek different types of conversation depending on their inclinations. Conversation-based decisions in organizations, by this logic, could be more stable than the decisions in our experiment.
However, the nearly 50-50 truth-lie ratio in our immediate choice condition suggests that decision makers in right-wrong situations are often torn, making it unclear whom to consult. Likewise, organizational advisors themselves may be torn, prompting unexpected and conflicting advice (Kidder, 1996) . Lingering temptation, then, may be as natural in the field as it is in the lab.
Organizational and Managerial Implications
Our results also suggest that organizational actors may be able to alter their own moral behavior, and that of their peers. Thus, the process of right-wrong decision making deserves practical as well as research attention. Organizational leaders might consciously design moral decision making processes, integrating them into training and enforcing them institutionally via policies, rewards, and sanctions. Policies mandating a -cooling off period‖ or multiple levels of approval for consequential decisions, for example, might provide institutional analogs for contemplation, and ethics hotlines might act as institutional conversations. Opportunities for instituting and improving these kinds of procedures abound.
Our results further suggest that some organizational cultures may naturally foster ethical and unethical behavior. Organizations with a -fast pulse‖ or tendency to reward quick decision making may suffer ethical penalties by discouraging contemplation and conversation. Organizations that afford time to think and talk with others-especially ethical others-should benefit from more ethical action. Similarly, organizations with interdependent workflows, which encourage conversation, might promote more ethical action than organizations of independent silos. Clearly, the norms that organizational members endorse and espouse matter a great deal.
Organizations full of economically-oriented employees, who laud and reward the pursuit of individual economic gain, are likely to produce and reproduce norms of self-interest (Miller, 1999) .
In contrast, organizations that not only laud but integrate moral values into everyday procedures may foster moral norms (Elster, 1989) . Thus, organizations might concentrate on not only publicizing ethical attitudes, but on praising and rewarding ethical role models (Brown et al., 2005 ) and on providing value-based frameworks for decision-making (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993) . At a minimum, our results suggest that organizational actors facing right-wrong decisions should take the time to think twice or to consult an ethical colleague, as either could promote an increase in moral awareness that might not surface from immediate choice or self-interested conversations. Both approaches appear to offer low-cost, high-impact routes to ethical action.
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The data in this study suggest that contemplation and moral conversation offer alternate paths to ethical action, while immediate choice and self-interested conversations undermine ethicality.
People's explanations, whenever they occur, seem to directly support their decisions, whatever their psychological source. These findings allowed us to present a preliminary, process model of moral decision making; we recognize its limitations but remain excited about the future research that it might stimulate.
Our study was conducted in the laboratory, with all of its associated benefits and limitations.
Although the lab enabled us to isolate subtle, psychological influences on moral decisions, with control that is unattainable in the field, it also created its own constraints. Our sample included undergraduates, with the normal cautions noted, so research using other samples would certainly be fruitful. Our study also used a single, simple situation, by design. Although researchers (e.g., Cohen generalizability, other contexts may evoke additional decision processes.
Clearly, many avenues remain open for future research (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008 ).
Studies could investigate how initial conversations and first decisions influence subsequent decisions, whether moral emotions are necessary and how contemplation and conversation might activate them, the limits of contemplative decision processes, how contemplation and conversation combine, the optimal moral decision making process, and the influence of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis, 2004) . Future research could also follow the moral decision making process into the future, tracing the behavioral implications of people's ready-made explanations-on decision makers, others, and organizations as a whole. Finally, research could investigate conversation in more naturalistic settings, documenting when and why people seek conversations, who they seek, and what they say. Many other approaches are eminently possible. Indeed, in the current climate of corporate malfeasance, future research is particularly welcome. We applaud and invite others to expand on our attempts to understand the psychological underpinnings of right-wrong decision making. Research that uncovers ways to promote the selection of -rights‖ over -wrongs‖ would bring tremendous benefit to organizations, their stakeholders, and their constituents. Here are the possible messages you can send to player 2:
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
APPENDIX B: EMAIL FROM CONVERSATION PARTNER
Moral Conversation Condition
Hello, how are u? Tough choice, eh? I dont know-as i think about how we're gonna make this choice, I cant help thinking that most other people would try to tell the truth. *Note: Typos and errors were created to make the emails seem more realistic. 
